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I. INTRODUCTION
"What do ya wanna do?" screams the union president over the roar
of incensed union members following the latest company contract of-
fer. "Strike, strike, strike," they chant in one voice. A vote is taken
and the economic strike begins with strong feelings of union solidar-
ity and the desire to obtain a fair collective bargaining agreement.
As the days and weeks pass by, the feelings of solidarity begin to
fade. Unpaid bills and dwindling bank accounts become common-
place. Soon the thoughts of returning to work begin to invade the
minds of disenchanted strikers. A dilemma is created; if they go back
to work and cross the picket lines their earnings will be negated by
union fines in an amount equal to their wages, but if they do not re-
turn, the financial pressures will overwhelm them. The only alterna-
tive is to tender a letter of resignation to the union. The union's
constitution, however, prohibits resignation during a strike, leaving
the employee trapped without any relief.
It was in just such a situation that forty three union members of
Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO, found them-
selves during an economic strike which lasted seven months.1 Eleven
of the members felt the financial pressure so strongly that they sub-
mitted letters of resignation only to become subject to union disci-
pline. The United States Supreme Court ultimately decided the
conflict in Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB,2 hold-
ing that employees had the right to resign, thereby restricting the
union's right to restrain.
After examining the historical background of the National Labor
Relations Act and subsequent judicial decisions which have inter-
preted it, this note will examine the Pattern Makers decision. The
opinion of the Court will be summarized along with the potential im-
pact in the area of union-employee-employer relations.
1. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 105 S. Ct. 3064, 3066 (1985).
2. Id.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Statutory Provisions
Prior to the passage of the Wagner Act of 1935,3 labor law had
progressed erratically from its early roots.4 In the early stages,
courts were quick to condemn the mere existence of labor organiza-
tions as a threat to legitimate enterprise. 5 Just prior to the Civil
War, however, the judicial system began to recognize their existence
as being noncriminal.6 By 1930, it became apparent that the develop-
ment of labor law rested primarily in the hands of the judicial sys-
tem.7 The emerging judicial policy was to selectively supress any
organized labor activity whenever it began to invade other aspects of
society.8 That began to change, however, with the onset of economic
disaster which was to strangle the nation's economy during the
1930's.
1. The Wagner Act of 1935
With the arrival of a democratic administration in 1932 came poli-
cies designed to promote and rehabilitate a dying business climate.
In 1933, Congress passed the National Industry Recovery Act
("NIRA"),9 intending to promote employees' rights to organize and
bargain collectively.1° Employers rebuffed such efforts by instead
creating their own unions with which to bargain."' The Supreme
Court, sympathetic to the urgings of employers, negated the intent
and substance of the NIRA in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
3. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Wagner Act].
4. See generally Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931).
5. Id. at 168. In Pennsylvania, eight bootmakers were convicted of the then-com-
mon law crime of "conspiracy to raise their wages" as a result of bonding together to
bargain with the footwear industry. Id.
6. S. COHEN, LABOR LAW 98-103 (1964). In Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metcalf 411
(1842), the Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Hunt and six co-
defendants who demanded the discharge of an employee for failure to join the Boston
Bootmaker Journeyman Society. Chief Justice Shaw's opinion, which was accepted in
virtually all later cases, stated "that the mere act of combination did not make a labor
organization an unlawful body." S. COHEN, supra, at 100.
7. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 138-39. There were three forces at work influencing
the status of labor law in the early 1900's: first, a prevailing property ideology; second,
a relative access to the important loci of political power enjoyed by labor and manage-
ment; and third, an attitude of the courts which encompassed and overlapped the first
two factors. As a result, the courts demonstrated a bias toward management over the
union. Id.
8. 1 C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 12-13 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
9. Law of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (amended by Act of June 14,
1935, ch. 246, 49 Stat. 375).
10. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 25.
11. Id. at 26.
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States,12 stating that Congress lacked authority to enact such legisla-
tion. Of greater significance, however, was the creation of the Na-
tional Labor Board, to which Senator Wagner was appointed.
Quickly sensing the inadequacy of the NIRA, Wagner began promot-
ing broader reforms which dramatically effected labor-management
relations. Wagner's intent was to give employees bargaining power
by allowing them to unite and organize rather than fight manage-
ment alone. This in turn would create a greater purchasing power,
thereby revitalizing American industry.1 3
The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act,14 passed on July 5,
1935,15 espoused four basic principles: 1) employees have the right to
determine whether they want a union organization; 2) employees are
to select their own bargaining representatives; 3) employers are not
12. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The Court held that Congress could not impose legislation
which indirectly affected commerce pursuant to U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It stated
that legislation indirectly affecting commerce was within the province of the state.
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 554-55. Because the National Industrial Recovery Act developed
around the concept of affecting commerce, its impact was virtually negated.
13. Madden, Origin and Early Years of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 571, 573 (1967).
14. See supra note 3. The purpose of the Act was to protect the interstate flow of
goods. The employer, by denying organizational rights and refusing to accept collec-
tive bargaining, in essence interfered with commerce. It was assumed that such inter-
ference would result in industrial strife that would restrict the physical movement of
goods. The resulting inequality of bargaining power would lead to a recurring business
depression. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 149.
15. Of particular importance were sections 7 and 8, which provided:
Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer -
(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided,
That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursu-
ant to section 6 (a), an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting em-
ployees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in the National
Industrial Recovery Act (U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended
from time to time, or in any code or agreement approved or prescribed there-
under, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an em-
ployer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established,
maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor
practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in sec-
to interfere with the rights of the employees; and 4) employers must
recognize and deal with the union representatives the employees
have selected.16 The Wagner Act was revolutionary in that it placed
restrictions on the employer's right to interfere with the employees'
choice of bargaining representatives. 17 By eliminating the employers'
ability to control the bargaining process, as employers had tradition-
ally done through dealing with their own approved agents, employees
were given the right of self-representation in the bargaining pro-
cess.18 In essence, the Wagner Act effected a dramatic change
in labor-management relations, providing freedom and power to em-
ployees in areas traditionally denied to them.19
The Court, in contrast to Schechter Poultry,20 upheld the Wagner
Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.2 1 A consistent policy
then began to emerge in a number of contemporaneous cases as the
Court upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB").22 Of even greater significance was the Court's resolve to
bring an end to its overt bias favoring the employer.23 While the sud-
den change in position by the Court was welcomed by employees, the
momentum of anti-unionism that employers had built up over the
years made change a difficult task.24 Nonetheless, Congress and the
tion 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agree-
ment when made.
(4) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this Act.
(5) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a).
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, §§ 7-8, 49 Stat. 452-53 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1982)).
16. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 144.
17. Id. at 149.
18. Id.
19. Senator Wagner stated: "Caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and
dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise, [the employee] can attain freedom and dig-
nity only by cooperation with others of his group." 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935).
20. See supra note 11.
21. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court recognized that the National Labor Relations Act
can be construed to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority. The Act is
constitutionally valid where applied to a situation where an employer engages in un-
fair labor practices that coerce and interfere with employee's right to self-organization.
The dramatic departure from Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), can be attributed to President Roosevelt's court-packing policy, where
Roosevelt increased the number of "liberals" on the bench who would support his poli-
cies. See generally 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES (1963).
22. See Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142
(1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49
(1937). In each of the above cases, all decided on the same date, the Court affirmed the
findings of the NLRB.
23. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 159.
24. Id. at 164.
Between 1935 and 1947, over 45,000 unfair complaints were filed with the
NLRB. About 43,000 of these cases were closed and employer violations were
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Court, recognizing the need for economic rehabilitation, took a signif-
icant step toward establishing and promoting the rights of the indi-
vidual worker.
2. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
During the years immediately following the enactment of the Wag-
ner Act, employers complained bitterly about the NLRB's reformist
zeal.25 With the election of a Republican majority to the Senate and
House in 1946, a change was in the making.26 As a result, Congress
amended the NLRA in 1947 by enacting the Labor-Management Re-
lations (Taft-Hartley) Act.2 7 The Taft-Hartley Act attempted to
reestablish the balance of power between labor and management. 28
It gave new rights to the employee and imposed new restrictions on
the union.29 The Taft-Hartley Act, however, went far beyond the
provisions of its predecessor. It expanded the scope of the NLRB,
created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and granted
authority to the President to intercede when strikes imperiled na-
tional health or safety. It also contained a provision allowing suits to
found in 45 percent of the instances. In the same time period, litigation for
enforcement or review of Board orders resulted in 705 decisions by the Circuit
Court of Appeals and 59 Supreme Court rulings. Remedial action ordered by
the Board when employers were found guilty of unfair practices included the
award of over 12 million dollars in back pay to 40,691 employees. In 8,516
cases employers were required to post notices that unfair practices would be
discontinued and 1,709 company unions were disestablished. More than 75,000
workers found to have been discriminatorily discharged were reinstated to
their jobs.
Id. at 163-64.
25. Id. at 164.
26. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 36. By the end of the first week of
the new Congress, 200 bills had been introduced on the subject of labor reform. Id
27. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as Taft-Hartley
Act].
28. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 35. Union membership had grown
between 1935 and 1947 from three million to fifteen million. Union leaders had gained
such prominent position that they were often consulted by the government in an at-
tempt to maintain industrial peace. One commentator stated that the labor movement
in 1947 was the "largest, most powerful, and the most aggressive that the world has
ever seen; and [that] the strongest unions. . . are the most powerful private economic
organizations in the country." Id. (quoting S. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 154 (1947)).
29. R. NEWMAN, THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS 11 (1953). The overriding philoso-
phy of the Taft-Hartley Act was to create employee collective bargaining organizations
free from employer interference, and at the same time create rights which affirma-
tively or negatively restricted union power. Id,
be brought by or against labor organizations.3 0
The most significant changes, however, occurred in sections 7 and 8
of the Act.3 1 While the additions to sections 7 and 8 were a sharp
blow to the unions, they were considerably milder than those pro-
posed by the House of Representatives. 32 In spite of this milder ver-
sion, employees were given, inter alia, the freedom to refrain from
participation in union activities and the right to bring charges against
unions engaging in unfair labor practices.3 3 To offset these rights,
the Taft-Hartley Act contained a provision3 4 to keep the government
from interfering with the internal affairs of the union.3 5
Following President Truman's upset victory in 1948, union leaders
30. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 179.
31. Section 7, as amended, stated:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist la-
bor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aide or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (emphasis added).
Section 8(b)(1) stated in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) Employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 7. Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein....
Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 8, 61 Stat. 140 (1947) (emphasis added).
32. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 171. The House favored a law which would have
had a greater punitive effect on the union than the Senate version. Among the House
proposals that were eliminated in the final version were limitations on industry-wide
bargaining, a ban on mass picketing, and a detailed regulation of the internal affairs of
a union, including preserving the right to resign.
The House Committee Report stated that "the right to resign from any organization
is a fundamental right. This section [proposed section 8(c)(4)] preserves the right for
union members." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 272, 323
(1948).
33. See supra note 31.
34. Section 8(b)(1)(A) states that the Act does not attempt to impair the union's
right to function or create and enforce its own rules regarding membership. See supra
note 30. The goal is to give the union room to operate, but to do so within defined
parameters to avoid the overreaching that was predominate in the era following the
enactment of the Wagner Act.
35. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 186-95. While the intent was admirable, it was also
impractical. By 1959, union corruption had become so rampant that Congress enacted
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 73
Stat. 519 (1959). The Landrum-Griffin Act provided an expanded bill of rights for
union members, while closely regulating disclosure and the internal affairs of the un-
ions. Government had moved away from the umpire role established in the Taft-Hart-
ley Act to the role of the policeman in the Landrum-Griffin Act, a role totally despised
by the unions. See S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 186-95.
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believed the time had arrived to return to the Wagner Act era.36 In
response, both the House and Senate passed bills which substantially
re-enacted the Wagner Act,37 thereby reaffirming employees' rights.
By mid-century, Congress had given employees the right to organ-
ize, the right to select their own collective bargaining representatives,
the right to participate in union activities, the right to refrain from
participation, and the right to report unfair union labor practices.
Unions were given the right to exist and act as collective bargaining
representatives. Because unions sometimes abused this acquired
power, Congress quickly imposed restrictions on unions to create a
realistic balance of power in labor-management relations.
B. Prior Supreme Court Decisions
In spite of the specific language of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts, there developed a wide area of controversy regarding their im-
plementation, thereby necessitating Supreme Court involvement.
Three such areas are addressed here.
1. Right Given To Unions To Enforce Internal Regulations
While the issue of a union's right to enforce its internal rules and
regulations through fines had surfaced prior to 1967,38 the Supreme
Court did not resolve the question until NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.3 9 The Court in Allis-Chalmers reaffirmed the
NLRB decision that a union may fine its members,40 but only follow-
36. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 46. Labor viewed the election as a
"popular mandate" to "return to the good old days of the Wagner Act." Id. (quoting
Aaron, Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A Decade of Frustration, 11 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 327, 329 (1958)).
37. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 8, at 47.
38. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954) (imposition of $500
fine by Union did not violate section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA because that section pre-
cludes any such interference with the internal affairs of a labor organization).
39. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). During lawful economic strikes at two Allis-Chalmer
plants, members of the United Auto Workers Locals 248 and 401 returned to work and
crossed the picket lines. After the strikes were over, charges were brought against
those members for conduct unbecoming a union member. The union imposed fines
ranging from $20 to $100, which were subsequently ignored by some of the members.
The union obtained a judgment against one of the members in a test suit brought in
the Milwaukee County Court. Allis-Chalmers, on behalf of the fined employees, filed
an unfair labor pracice charge against the various locals alleging a violation of section
8(b)(1)(A). 388 U.S. at 176-77.
40. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. (Local 248), 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964). The Board sus-
tained the examiner's decision to dismiss the complaint as the alleged restraint or coer-
cion referred to in section 8(b)(1)(A) fit within the proviso. When the union acts in a
ing a violation of the union's by-laws or constitution.41 The Court
noted that, consistent with the Landrurn-Griffin Act42 and federal la-
bor policy, the union has the inherent power to fine or expel strike
breakers as part of its role as an effective bargaining agent.43 The
Court saw its role as an enforcer of the contractual agreement
between the union and its members relating to representation and
responsible conduct.44 When the conduct of a member was irrespon-
sible in light of the union's constitution, fines were a natural
consequence.
The Court implied a sharp distinction between internal and exter-
nal matters to which the proviso applied.45 Recognizing that regula-
tion of internal matters through fines fell within the scope of the
proviso, the Court affirmed the unions' right to discipline its mem-
bers.46 However, the Court failed to fully resolve the issue whether
the judicial system could or should act as an enforcer of subsequent
fines.47
manner consistent with the right "to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acqui-
sition or retention of membership therein," the prohibition of section 8(b)(1)(A) is in-
applicable. 149 N.L.R.B. at 69.
41. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 178. Such a decision cannot be extended beyond vi-
olation of lawful union activity. The NLRB has repeatedly recognized unfair labor
practices when unions have fined members who engaged in conduct which exceeded
these boundaries. See, e.g., Communications Workers of Am., Local 1101, 208 N.L.R.B.
267 (1974) (union ordered to cancel and repay fines levied on workers who crossed
picket line after resigning from union); NLRB v. Local 13-B, Graphic Arts Int'l. Union,
682 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (union ordered to rescind
disciplinary action against members who violated union rule banning overtime work).
42. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 186-95.
43. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181 (quoting Summers, Legal Limitations on Union
Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1951)). The Court recognized the fine balance be-
tween labor and management, including the major weapon in labor's arsenal for
achieving realistic labor agreements, i.e., the strike. To deny the union the right to
fine non-striking union members would be equivalent to the denial of unions' rights to
use the weapon. At that point, a shift would occur favoring management over the em-
ployees. This was not the intent of the Taft-Hartley amendments. 388 U.S. at 181.
44. 388 U.S. at 182 (quoting Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What The
Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 180 (1960)). The Court's position was anchored on
the premise that a contract existed between a union and its membership, imposing re-
sponsibilities and obligations on the members. Breach of the contract resulted in justi-
fiable fines. The role of the Court was merely to enforce the contract and, when
reasonable, affirm the fines. However, the strength of the contract theory has been
eroded by subsequent decisions. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Work-
ers Union of Am., 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
45. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 186. The Court, citing Senator Taft's comments, 93
CONG. REC. 4435-36 (1947), regarding external matters which are regulated by section
8(b)(1)(A), noted that a union cannot fine members for failure to participate in threat-
ening bodily harm and coercion preventing employees not involved in a labor dispute
from going to work. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 189. Internal matters that allowed for
the application of democratic principles, fair procedures, and freedom of speech were
beyond the scope of prohibitions found in section 8(b)(1)(A). 388 U.S. at 195.
46. 388 U.S. at 192.
47. Id. Justice Brennan noted that the legislative history of the Act indicated a
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Two years later, the issue resurfaced in Scofield v. NLRB.48 The
Court, in determining whether the union violated unfair labor prac-
tices, established a three-prong test.49 The Court determined that a
rule regarding the implementation of a piecework ceiling was a legiti-
mate internal matter,50 and its imposition did not impair the labor
policy developed by Congress. 51 As a result, the Court found the im-
position of fines not to be a violation of section 8(b)(1)(a) of the Wag-
ner Act.5
2
2. Unions Cannot Enforce Regulations Against Non-Members
Approximately three years after Scofield, the Court was faced with
the issue whether fines could be imposed on members who resigned
during a strike. In NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Work-
ers Union, Local 1029,53 the Court determined that the union's power
over its members ends when the members lawfully resign from the
complete lack of congressional concern regarding judicial enforcement of fines. If
Congress was acting on a contract theory of the union-member relationship and if the
efficacy of a contract includes its legal enforceability, then it would be a logical conclu-
sion to assume that courts would enforce union fines.
Justice Brennan questioned the wisdom of enforcing unreasonably large fines. He
noted, however, that such a concern should not result in interpreting the Act to allow
for enforcement of only reasonable fines. Id. at 192-93.
The issue regarding enforcement of unreasonable fines is frequently resolved by
state courts, who "find ways to strike down 'discipline [which] involves a severe hard-
ship.'" Summers, supra note 43, at 1051. In NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973),
the Court stated that the determination of the reasonableness of fines was within the
discretion of state courts, not the NLRB. Id. at 74-76.
48. 394 U.S. 423 (1969). In Scofield, union rules required its members to allow the
company to withhold immediate payment of wages earned for production above a
piecework ceiling. The company was to "bank" the wages and make payment when
the ceiling was not reached by an individual employee due to machine failure or some
other reason. Failure to comply resulted in fines ranging from $1 to $100. Id. at 424-
25. Some members exceeded the ceiling rate and were subsequently fined. They re-
fused to pay the fines alleging unfair union labor practices based on section 8(b)(1)(A).
394 U.S. at 426.
49. Comment, Protecting a Union Member's Right to Resign-Resolution of the
Conflict Between Dalmo Victor and Rockford-Beloit, 38 VAND. L. REV. 201, 224 (1985).
The three prong test, which determines whether a union rule violates section
8(b)(1)(A), is as follows: 1) whether the union rule furthers a legitimate union interest;
2) whether the rule impairs congressional labor policy; and 3) whether the rule reason-
ably applies against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the
rule. 38 VAND. L. REV. at 224 (citing Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430).
50. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 431. "The fear is that the competitive pressure generated
will endanger workers' health, foment jealousies, and reduce the work force." Id.
51. Id. at 432.
52. Id. at 436.
53. 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
union.54 Referring to, Scofield,55 the Court noted that where there is
a lawful dissolution of a union-member relationship, the union abro-
gates its control.56 The Court consequently refused to allow the
union to impose fines on a member who had resigned.57 The major-
ity saw no conflict with its prior holding in Allis-Chalmers, where
fines were imposed on full union members.58
In a related case, Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB,5 9 the Court reaf-
firmed its position that fines imposed on employees who crossed
picket lines after lawfully resigning constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice.60 Utilizing the rationale of Granite State,61 the Court applied
the law of free institutions: "[T]he right of the individual to join or
resign from associations, as he sees fit 'subject of course to any finan-
cial obligations due and owing' the group with which he was associ-
ated."62  Because the resignations of sixty one members were
tendered prior to crossing the picket lines, nothing was "due and ow-
54. Id. at 216.
55. 394 U.S. at 429-30.
56. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217. The Court found that "when there is a lawful
dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former
member than it has over the man in the street." Id.
There is more than a single classification of union "member" as implied by the
courts. In NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963), the Court recog-
nized "quasi-members" as those who paid dues and initiation fees but did not become
participants in the union. This classification is usually found in union shops which
force union membership as part of the union security agreement. A second form of
membership exists in agency shops where employees are required to reimburse the
union for costs incurred while representing the bargaining unit. A third form of mem-
bership occurs where the union, as part of its security agreement, imposes no obliga-
tion upon the employees to join the union. The only obligation involves the payment
of dues as a condition to employment. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 642 (1976).
The issue as to whether a financial-core member can be fined remains unresolved.
See, e.g., Johannesen, Disciplinary Fines as Interference With Protected Rights: Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A), 24 LAB. L.J. 268 (1973); Levin & Werhan, Restrictions on the Right to
Resign: Can a Member's Freedom to "Escape the Union Rule" Be Overcome by Union
Boilerplate?, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 397 (1974).
57. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217-18. The union had argued that it had a practice
of accepting resignations only during an annual ten day period, during which the em-
ployees could revoke their "dues-check-off authorizations." However, the court of ap-
peal found no evidence that the employees knew of the practice or had consented to a
restriction on their right to resign. NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers
Union, Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369, 372 (1st Cir. 1971).
58. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 215.
59. 412 U.S. 84 (1973). The union had called a lawful strike against the Boeing
Company which lasted 18 days. During that period, 143 of the 19,000 employees repre-
sented by the union crossed the picket lines and returned to work. Of this group, 61
resigned prior to returning to work, while 58 others resigned after returning. The
union constitution and bylaws contained no provision expressly permitting or forbid-
ding such resignations. Id. at 85-86.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216.
62. Id. (quoting Communications Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 835, 838 (2d
Cir. 1954)).
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ing the group."6 3 Thus, any attempt by the union to impose and col-
lect fines on these individuals constituted a violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Wagner Act.
3. Union Members Have A Right to Resign
Inherent within the provision of section 7 of the Wagner Act is the
right to refrain from concerted union activities, i.e., the right to re-
sign.6 4 To restrict this right in the wake of Granite State and Booster
Lodge, unions inserted clauses into their bylaws regulating the
tendering of resignations.65 The effectiveness of such language is
highly questionable.66 Dicta of Granite State,67 relied on by the
NLRB,68 reaffirms the right to resign in spite of union constitutional
provisions to the contrary. 69 Even though an increased number of
unfair labor practice charges have been filed in light of newly-im-
posed restrictions on resignations, the Court has avoided the issue of
a union member's right to resign until recently.70
63. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88-89.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 157 states in pertinent part that "[e]mployees
shall have the right to . . . refrain from any or all of such activities except to the ex-
tent that such right may be effected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3). ... Id.
65. See Note, A Union's Right to Control Strike-Period Resignations, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 339 (1985). In numerous instances, unions attempt to restrict resignations to a
time period outside the scope of any impending or actual strike. One extreme example
is a clause in the constitution of the American Guild of Musical Artists which bars res-
ignations altogether without the consent of the Board. Id. at 342 n.19.
66. See General Elec. Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 608, 609 (1972); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 219
N.L.R.B. 729, 729-30 (1975). In both cases, the Board relied on prior court holdings
that restrictions on resignations were impermissibly broad and violated section
8(b)(1)(A). See generally Gould, Solidarity Forever - Or Hardly Ever: Union Disci-
pline, Taft-Hartley, and the Right of Union Members to Resign, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 74
(1980).
67. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 216. The Court implied that a union member can
resign at any time, the only requirement being that he fulfill any financial obligations
due and owing at the time of resignation. Id. (quoting Communications Workers of
Am. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 835, 838 (2d. Cir. 1954).
68. Ex-Cello Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1051 (1977).
69. See George Banta Co., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 850, 851 (1980); San Diego County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 243 N.L.R.B. 147, 148 (1979); Able Sheet Metal Prods.,
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1180 (1976); Metal-Fab, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1156, 1159-60 (1976).
In each of these cases, the Board invalidated restrictive resignation clauses holding the
provision to be unenforceable and the member free to resign at will. Comment, supra
note 49, at 211.
70. The Court decided this issue in Pattern-Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB,
105 S. Ct. 3064 (1985).
C. Prior Appellate Court Decisions
1. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - Machinists Local 1327 v.
NLRB
In 1979, the NLRB petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
to enforce the Board's order in NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327
(Dalmo Victor I).71 The Board had held that a union provision re-
stricting resignations,72 in spite of its language, unjustifiably at-
tempted to regulate the conduct of its members following the
submission of letters of resignation.73 The Board had relied heavily
on its prior decision in O.K Tool Co., Inc.,74 noting that the union's
proscription of post-resignation strike breaking had impaired a for-
mer member's section 7 right to refrain from concerted activity. This
ruling conflicted with the Scofield requirement that union members
be free to leave the union to escape membership conditions that they
considered onerous.75 The court of appeals refused to enforce the or-
der and remanded the matter back to the NLRB.76
The court concluded that the majority had applied a hypertechni-
cal reading to the union's constitution.77 Instead of construing the
provision as one which regulates post-resignation conduct, the major-
ity sided with the Board's dissenting opinion.78 The provision should
71. 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979). In 1974, the union apprised its members of an
amendment to its constitution providing that a member can be fined for "improper
conduct of a member" if the member accepts employment in an establishment where a
strike or lockout exists. Resignation did not release the member from the obligation if
it was submitted within 14 days preceding the strike.
Three members submitted resignations and went back to work at least 8 months af-
ter the picket lines were established at Dalmo Victor. The union, pursuant to the pro-
vision in its constitution to which each of the members had been alerted, fined those
three members. Id. at 1220-21.
72. The union provision stated:
Improper Conduct of a Member:... Accepting employment in any capacity in
an establishment where a strike or lockout exists as recognized under this
Constitution, without permission. Resignation shall not relieve a member of
his obligation to refrain from accepting employment at the establishment for
the duration of the strike or lockout within 14 days preceding its commence-
ment. Where observance of a primary picket line is required, resignation shall
not relieve a member of his obligation to oberve the primary picket line for its
duration if the resignation occurs during the period that the picket line is
maintained or within 14 days preceding its establishment.
Id. at 1220.
73. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor I), 231 N.L.R.B. 719, 720 (1977).
74. 215 N.L.R.B. 651 (1974), overruled, NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo
Victor I), 608 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979).
75. Dalmo Victor 1, 231 N.L.R.B. at 720 (quoting O.K. Tool Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 651,
653 (1974)).
76. Dalmo Victor I, 608 F.2d at 1222.
77. Id.
78. Dalmo Victor I, 231 N.L.R.B. at 724-25. NLRB members Jenkins and Murphy
concluded that the language of the provision was primarily intended to limit members'
right to resign and not to regulate post-resignation conduct. Jenkins interpreted the
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have been read as a restriction on the right to resign rather than a
restriction on post-resignation activity. 79 The court concluded the
Board had reached a decision and generated an order based on a non-
issue. Since the validity of restrictions on resignation was not before
the court, the case was remanded to the Board for further delibera-
tions along those lines.80
The Board, on remand, in Dalmo Victor 11,81 considered the possi-
bility of a balance between the competing interests of the employee's
right to resign and the union's right to impose reasonable restric-
tions.82 The Board stated that "the restrictions by [the union] here
are unreasonable in that they failed to protect sufficiently the inter-
est of individual employees. 83 Had the union instituted a rule re-
stricting the right to resign to a thirty day time period following the
tender of the resignation, it would have protected the interests of the
employee while providing adequately for the needs of the union dur-
ing strike periods.8 4 The plurality concluded that the restriction on
resignations was unenforceable and violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Wagner Act.85
The union petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for re-
view. The Board cross-appealed for enforcement of its order ruling
that the union had committed unfair labor practices.8 6 The court
once again refused to enforce the Board's order, noting that the re-
strictive language regarding resignations comported with both the na-
tional labor policy and the test previously set out in Scofield.87 The
court also refused to validate the thirty day rule advanced by the
phrase "resignation shall not relieve a member of his obligation [to honor a strike]" as
indicating the union's intent to restrict resignation. Id. at 724.
79. Dalmo Victor 1, 608 F.2d at 1222.
80. Id.
81. Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982).
82. Id. at 985.
83. Id. The Board, recognizing employee interest based on section 7, did not hold
that that interest is absolute. Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Allis-Chal-
mers that a union may discipline members for crossing a picket line, there is a recogni-
tion that limited restrictions may be imposed on the right to resign, so long as the
rules are equally applicable in strike and non-strike periods. Id. at 985-87.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 987. NLRB chairman Van De Water and member Hunter concurred, re-
lying on NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, 409 U.S.
213 (1972), stating that any restriction on resignation was unacceptable. Dalmo Victor
1, 263 N.L.R.B. at 988.
86. Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB (Dalmo Victor II), 725 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.
1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 3517 (1985).
87. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1214. Neither Granite State nor Booster Lodge
405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973), ever resolved the issue as to whether a union rule
Board.88
The court's rationale for denying enforcement of the order was
that the nation's labor policy does not conflict with imposing restric-
tions on resignations. While the court recognized the union's fiduci-
ary duty, it noted that neither Congress nor the United States
Supreme Court gave individual union members the license to avoid
union rules designed to protect the overall welfare of the bargaining
unit.8 9 Congress implied that the welfare of the bargaining unit
should take precedence over the interests of the individual.90
The court stated that the test set out in Scofield 91 was not designed
to be a balancing act, but rather was a three-step analysis designed to
determine whether a union rule could be enforced.9 2 The union's
rule regarding resignations satisfied each of the three prongs, and
therefore did not constitute a violation of section 8(a).93 Referring to
that expressly penalized a member for resigning during a strike and subsequently re-
turning to work for the same employer was valid. 725 F.2d at 1214 n.1.
88. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1215.
89. Id. at 1216. The court believed Congress intended to support the union's right
to control and limit the actions of its members by including the proviso of section
8(b)(1)(A), which reserves to unions the right to make reasonable rules as to the re-
tention and acquisition of its members. The court quoted Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
181-82, which stated: "The power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the
union is to be an effective bargaining agent .... Dalmo Victor I, 725 F.2d at 1216.
90. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181-82. "The complete satisfaction of all who are
represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed
a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always
to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." Id. at
180 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
91. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969). As previously noted, the test to de-
termine whether a union rule is valid involves three prongs: 1) whether the rule re-
flects a legitimate union interest; 2) whether the rule impairs congressional labor law
policy; and 3) whether the rule is reasonably enforced against union members. Id.
92. Dalmo Victor I, 725 F.2d at 1216-17.
93. Id. at 1217-18.
With regard to the first prong, the court held that a legitimate union interest ex-
isted. Post-resignation strikebreaking is a major threat to the union's viability. It
could potentially create a chain reaction leading to the ultimate breakdown of the bar-
gaining unit, thereby defeating the purpose of organization.
Second, post-resignation strikebreaking defeats the inherent principle of mutual re-
liance among the members once a strike vote is taken. To fine those who attempt to
resign and return to work is merely to enforce a contract between each of the mem-
bers. With regard to the second prong, the court stated that the rule did not reflect an
impairment of congressional labor policy. The conflict created by the Board between
section 7 and section 8(b)(1)(A) were non-existent; the right to resign can co-exist with
the right to restrict resignations. The union rule did not proscribe resignations alto-
gether, but merely placed some obstacles in the way. The member was free to resign
and return to work; the only prohibition was against returning to work for the same
employer.
Third, the rule was reasonably enforced against union members. The rule was not
only reasonable, but it was critical. The restrictions on resignations occur during a
time when the union needs to present a solid front to the employer. If enforcement is
not permitted, then the union would be unable to fine recalcitrant members, and
would have no means to prevent them from working for the struck employer. As a
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the requirement regarding reasonableness, previously alluded to in
Allis-Chalmers,94 the court stated that the fining of strikebreakers is
a reasonable restriction on the right of a union member to resign.95
2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals - Pattern Makers' League
of North America v. NLRB
Approximately three months after Dalmo Victor II, the Board
reached a similar decision in Pattern Makers' League of North
America.96 Similar to Dalmo Victor II, the Pattern Makers' union
adopted an amendment to its constitution known as League Law 13. 97
Some employees subsequently tendered their resignations during the
course of a strike and returned to work for the employer, which re-
sulted in notification of impending fines under League Law 13.98 Be-
cause of the similarity to Dalmo Victor II, the Board saw its decision
in that instance as controlling.99 Consequently, the Board ruled that
the union's decision to fine the employees constituted an unfair labor
practice. 00
The union appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.1O'
Recognizing the conflict between the employees' right to resign or re-
frain from union activity under section 7,102 and the union's right to
regulate its internal affairs as stated in the proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A),o3 the court attempted to resolve the inherent tension.
The union first argued that the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) vali-
result, the effectiveness and value of the union is defeated. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d
at 1217-18.
94. 308 U.S. at 180. See supra note 90.
95. Dalmo Victor II, 725 F.2d at 1218.
96. 265 N.L.R.B. 1332 (1982), enforced sub nom., Pattern Makers' League of N.
Am. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
97. 265 N.L.R.B. at 1332. League Law 13, adopted and ratified in May, 1976, to
stop a growing pattern of strike breaking by employees, stated: "[N]o resignation or
withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike
or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent." Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1333. Because the provision clearly restricted resignations during a
strike period, or when one "appears imminent," and because Dalmo Victor II, which
was reached after examining the Court's holdings in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423
(1969), and NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., Local
1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), was controlling, the decision required minimal amplification.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). See supra note 31 for the full text of section 7.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). See supra note 31 for the full text of section
8(b)(1)(A).
dated League Law 13,104 thereby giving the union authority to fine its
members. The court rejected this argument, relying on the language
of the Scofield Court which stated that "if the rule invades or frus-
trates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be en-
forced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating section
8(b)(1)."105 Citing other decisions in which the court determined that
union fines frustrated the right of employees to resign,10 6 the court
concluded that League Law 13 frustrated "the overriding policy of la-
bor law that employees be free to choose whether to engage in con-
certed activities."10 7 The union's interest in maintaining strength
and solidarity during a strike, while significant, cannot justify com-
pelling membership in the union which improperly infringes on the
employees' rights. 0 8 Thus, the court concluded that a union rule re-
quiring retention of membership cannot be considered an internal
matter and is therefore outside of the scope of the proviso. 0 9
The union advanced a second argument based on a mutual reliance
theory to support League Law 13.110 Relying on Granite State"' and
the lack of qualitative difference between the facts of that case and
Pattern Makers, the court concluded that the mutual reliance theory
cannot control." 2
In conclusion, the court, quoting Scofield, stated that a member
must be free to leave the union when a rule to which he was opposed
could not be changed." 3 "[T]his fundamental principle is the embod-
iment of individual's Section 7 rights and safeguards the balance be-
tween individual rights and the collective power of the union."114
Utilizing that principle, as it applied to the facts of Pattern Makers,
the court granted enforcement of the Board's order.
104. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 59.
105. Id. (quoting Scofield, 394 U.S. at 429).
106. Id. at 59-60. See, e.g., Granite State, 409 U.S. at 214-16; Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428-
20; Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89-90.
107. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 60.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 60-61. The union contended that each member, in voting on whether to
strike, waives his section 7 rights to abandon the strike at a later date by resigning.
Since each employee retains his membership with full knowledge of the restrictions
contained in League Law 13, the relationship between the membership is one of volun-
tary association and its mutual covenants are enforceable. Id.
111. Id. at 61. The Court in Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217, gave little weight to the
"mutual reliance" theory. In spite of the First Circuit's conclusion that members
waive their section 7 rights when they vote to strike, the Court decided that the inter-
ests of the individual employees took precedence. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 61.
112. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 61.
113. Id. at 61. The court stated: "If a member chooses not to engage in this con-
certed activity and is unable to prevail on the other members to change the rule, then
he may leave the union and obtain whatever benefits in job advancement and extra
pay may result .... Id. (quoting Scofield, 394 U.S. at 435).
114. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 61.
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The conflicting holdings in Dalmo Victor II and Pattern Makers re-
sulted in the United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to re-
solve the matter.1 15
III. THE PROBLEM
Consistent with what the Pattern Makers' League of North
America, AFL-CIO, believed to be included in the proviso to section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Wagner Act," 6 League Law 13's resiriction on res-
ignation was added to the League's constitution."i 7 Approximately
one year later, two locals began an economic strike with forty three
participating members against several manufacturing companies."18
During the ensuing seven months, ten members submitted letters of
resignation and returned to work.1 9 The union notified each mem-
ber that their resignations had been rejected as violative of League
Law 13, and that they were subject to fines equal to their earnings
115. 105 S. Ct. 79 (1984).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). Subsection (b)(1) states:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not im-
pair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the
selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances....
Id.
117. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 185 S. Ct. 3064, 3066 (1985). In
May, 1976, League Law 13 was added; it became effective in October, 1976. There was
no contention that the fined members were unaware of the amendment or its lan-
guage.
Donald L. Hansen, the business agent for the League, testified that each member
had to take an "oath of membership obligating them to adhere to the 'Constitution,
Laws, Rules and Decisions' of the League and its Associations .... Pattern Makers'
League of N. Am., 265 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1338 (1982).
118. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3066.
119. Id. Although the Court referred to ten employees who submitted resignations,
there were actually eleven.
On September 11, 1977, William Kohl became the first to tender his resignation, re-
turning to work the following day. On that date, the League expelled him from its
membership. On September 26, 1977, four additional employees tendered their resig-
nation letters; they were followed by six more members at subsequent intervals. Of
this group, only Kohl was expelled from membership, with the remainder receiving
notice that their letters of resignation were ineffective.
John Nelson was the only other exception. He began working a few months prior to
the strike and had never technically joined the League. On January 17, 1978, the
League returned his check for payment of union dues, claiming that he was not a
member of the League and therefore did not owe any dues. Pattern Makers, 265
N.L.R.B. at 1337.
during the strike.120
The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association, which repre-
sented the employers throughout the collective bargaining process,121
filed charges with the NLRB stating that the League and two of its
locals committed unfair labor practices in fining employees who had
previously resigned from the union.122 The NLRB, relying on Dalmo
Victor II and the language of section 7, held that League Law 13 did
not justify the fine.123 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals en-
forced the order, thereby reaffirming the employees' right to
resign.124
The League, throughout the appeals process, consistently argued
that section 8(b)(1)(A) granted it the right to regulate its internal af-
fairs through the prescription of rules relating to the acquisition or
retention of its members. 125 Even though the Seventh Circuit had
dismissed the contention, a strong possibility remained that inconsis-
tent decisions would be rendered in other circuits.
To resolve the conflict between the Seventh Circuit, which af-
firmed the employees' section 7 rights, and the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed the union's section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso rights, the United
States Supreme Court deferred to the Board's interpretation of the
NLRA.126 In so doing, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals.127
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
The key issue in Pattern Makers was whether the proviso to sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Wagner Act128 applied to restrictions imposed
on resignations. Justice Powell, writing the opinion for Justices Bur-
ger, O'Connor, and Rehnquist, attempted to resolve the issue which
120. Pattern Makers, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1337. Since Kohl and Nelson were not mem-
bers, the League sent letters to Atlas Pattern Works, their employer, requesting that
action be taken to rectify the situation, since neither Kohl nor Nelson were in compli-
ance with the union-security clause which was part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id.
121. Id at 1336-37. The association existed only to collectively bargain with the
League. The eleven members of the association sell and ship patterns for castings. Fa-
cilities are located throughout Rockford, Illinois and Beloit, Wisconsin. Id.
122. Id. at 1336. Charges were filed on January 23, 1978 by the association, and a
complaint and notice of hearing was issued on March 7, 1978, alleging violation of sec-
tions 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. On June 7, 1978, an amended complaint was
issued alleging additional violations. At the time of the hearing, amendments were
made to the complaint by adding similar allegations. Id.
123. Pattern Makers, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1334.
124. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 61.
125. Id. at 59.
126. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3076.
127. Id
128. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See supra note 121 for the full text of section
8(b)(1)(A).
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the Court had consistently side-stepped.129 The majority delineated
three major propositions while responding to three of the petitioner's
arguments, and ultimately reached a conclusion which affirmed the
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 130
A. Enforcement of Union Regulations Has Qualified Recognition
Relying on the language of NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufactur-
ing Co.,131 the majority noted that unions are not barred from fining
members as long as they meet three requirements.132 First, unions
cannot fine former members who have resigned and engaged in activ-
ity which would otherwise subject them to punishment.133 Activities
of individuals who had resigned from the union are classified as "ex-
ternal affairs," outside of the scope of union regulations and fines.134
Second, fines can be levied as punishment only for violation of in-
ternal matters.135 Since union constitutions at the time of the enact-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 did not include restrictions on
resignations,136 extending such provisions into the area of "internal
affairs" is unjustified.137 As a result, fines levied for non-internal
129. See supra note 87.
130. Pattern Makers, 724 F.2d at 61.
131. 388 U.S. 175 (1967). The Court in Allis-Chalmers recognized that the practice
of imposing fines was not an automatic violation of an employee's section 7 rights. Id.
at 192. The Court noted that the sponsor of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso never in-
tended it to "'interfere with the internal affairs of organization of unions.'" Id. at 187
(quoting 93 CONG. REC. 4272 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball)).
132. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3068.
133. See generally NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am.,
Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
Both opinions reinforce the premise of Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), that
fines may be levied only against full union members, not those who had left the union
and participated in post-resignation activity forbidden by the union constitutions.
However, neither opinion resolved the issue as to the extent limitations may be placed
on the right to resign.
134. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 187-90.
135. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1967); NLRB v Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 74
(1973).
136. Millan, Disciplinary Developments Under § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 20 Loy. L. REV. 245, 269 (1974).
Until the 1970's, very few unions had constitutional provisions limiting membership
resignations. At the time of the Taft-Hartley debate, there were virtually no union
constitutions which embodied such restrictions. Consequently, such restrictions, at
that time, were not considered an internal concern. Id.
137. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3069.
In an analysis of Machinists Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330
(1984), one commentator stated: "A union's unilateral extension of an employee's
membership obligation through restrictions on resignation artificially expands the def-
inition of internal action and allows the union to continue to regulate conduct over
matters were not within the scope of prior Court decisions.138
Third, unions cannot punish those members not free to resign. Re-
ferring to Scofield,139 the majority stated that the freedom to resign
was critical in determining whether the imposition of fines consti-
tuted restraint or coercion as outlined in section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Wagner Act.140 When the union fines members who are unable to
escape its rules, there is the curtailment of freedom that the Textile
Workers Court held paramount.141 Since League Law 13 failed to
meet any of these requirements, the fines were outside of the realm
of permissible union regulation.
B. Enforcement of Union Regulations Cannot Violate
Congressional Policy
Justice Powell stated that a restriction on resignations violates the
policy of voluntary unionism inherent in congressional labor policy as
espoused by the NLRB.142 Since the intent of Congress was to re-
create the spirit of voluntary unionism, which had disappeared dur-
which it would otherwise have no control." Note, Protecting a Union Member's Right
to Resign-Resolution of the Conflict Between Dalmo Victor and Rockford-Beloit, 38
VAND. L. REV. 201, 222 (1985).
138. See supra note 133.
139. 394 U.S. at 430. The Scofield Court stated that fines imposed on union mem-
bers who violated a union rule prohibiting violation of ceiling production rates were
justified. Because members were given the opportunity to resign and avoid the rule,
enforcement was reasonable. Id.
If members found themselves unable to take advantage of the right to earn more
money by exceeding the piecework limits, it was only because they had deliberately
decided not to resign and remain members of the union. Id. at 435.
140. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3070. Justice Powell also looked to the decision
in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., Local 1029, 409
U.S. 213 (1972). He concluded that when a union prohibits resignations, fines imposed
on former members "restrained or coerced them within the meaning of section
8(b)(1)(A)." Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3070.
141. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3070.
142. Id. The Court referred to the Board's position in Machinists Local 1414
(Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1984), and Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo
Victor II), 263 N.L.R.B. 984 (1982), wherein the Board found restrictions on the right
to resign inconsistent with the policy of section 8(a)(3) of the Wagner Act. Section
8(a)(3) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer - (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Pro-
vided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein
on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later ... Provided fur-
ther, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the
same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or termi-
nated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the peri-
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ing the era following the Wagner Act, union rules such as League
Law 13 violate that policy.143 Since an employee would be unable to
resign from the League, fining a union member would amount to a
requirement that he maintain his membership, a concept directly in
conflict with voluntary unionism.
The League unsuccessfully argued that the restriction on resigna-
tions was unrelated to union membership as a prerequisite to em-
ployment. The fines imposed, the League argued, did not violate or
effect employment rights because they were intended only to punish
those who had violated union rules.144 The majority found the
League's argument unpersuasive; it considered fines which equaled
an employee's entire paycheck to be violative of his employment
rights.145 Consequently, the court determined that the restriction
was an impairment of congressional policy.146
C. The League's Arguments Lacked Merit
The League advanced three arguments to support its position.
First, the League argued that union rules restricting the right to re-
sign are protected by section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Wagner Act.147 The
League argued that because League Law 13 places restrictions on the
right to withdraw from the League, it relates to the retention of
membership. 48 The majority noted that neither the Board nor the
Court has ever interpreted the proviso to reflect the League's posi-
tion, but have instead interpreted the language as referring to expul-
sion of union members.149 The legislative history of the Act supports
odic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
143. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3071. The Taft-Hartley Act eliminated the closed
shop which required compulsory union membership. The Act gave employees the
freedom to resign or refrain from full membership, as long as they paid their dues.
The only requirement for employment in a union security agreement is their payment.
"'Membership' as a condition of employment, is whittled down to its financial core."
NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
144. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3071.
145. Id. The majority quoted a commentator who stated that the fines had not left
a "worker's employment rights inviolate when it exacts a portion of his paycheck in
satisfaction of a fine imposed for working." Wellington, Union Fines and Workers'
Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022, 1023 (1976).
146. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3071.
147. Id See supra note 121 for the full text of section 8(b)(1).
148. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3072.
149. Id. The majority referred to the interpretation in Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at
this view.150
Second, the League argued that the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act indicates that Congress had no intention of eliminating
resignation restrictions.151 Justice Powell noted that this contention
lacks support, as the proposal regarding the right to resign was intro-
duced in the context of closed shops which were prevalent in. the
1935-1947 era.152 The final version of the Act, which eliminated any
language regarding restrictions on resignations, is inconclusive be-
cause numerous employee rights were not specifically addressed.153
As a result, the legislative history does not conflict with the Board's
interpretation, in spite of its recognized ambiguity, at least not suffi-
ciently to demonstrate that the Board's interpretation is
unreasonable.154
Third, the League argued that the nature of voluntary association
does not proscribe restrictions placed on resignations.155 The major-
ity was quick to note that even though common law principles re-
garding voluntary associations had some weight, the common law
concept was inapplicable in this case, 156 especially because it violated
public policy. v5 7 Deferring to the Board's conclusions, and giving lit-
tle regard to the common law, Justice Powell concluded that League
Law 13 violated the principle of voluntary unionism. 5 8
191-92, where the Court assumed the provision gave unions the authority to impose.
fines and carry out the threat of expulsion. Id.
150. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3072. Senator Holland, who sponsored the pro-
viso, stated that the proviso was for the purpose of assuring there to be no restriction
on union rules that have to do with either the admission or expulsion of members. 93
CONG. REC. 4271 (1947). During the debate, Senator Taft accepted the proviso because
he believed that a union should retain the right to refuse admission to, as well as ex-
pulsion from, the union. Id. at 4272.
During subsequent House debates concerning the Landrum-Griffin Act, a proposal
was introduced to prohibit expulsion of members from a union for discriminatory rea-
sons. The two sponsors of the Act opposed the proposal on the ground that they did
not seek to repeal the proviso. 105 CONG. REC. 15722-23 (1959).
151. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3073. While the House bill contained a provision
making it an unfair labor practice to deny a union member the right to resign at any
time, H.R. 3020, § 8(c)(4), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), the Senate Bill, as eventually
enacted, eliminated the specific language of the House version. H.R. 3020, § 8(b)(1)(A),
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1947).
152. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3073.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3073-74.
155. Id. at 3074. The League relied on the language of Granite State, 409 U.S. at
216, and Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 88, where the Court stated that when a union's
rules do not claim to restrict the right to resign, then the common law normally re-
flected in "free institutions" is applicable. Since the common law does not prohibit re-
strictions on resignations, such limitations do not violate section 8(b)(1)(A). Pattern
Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3074.
156. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3074.
157. Id. at 3075.
158. Id.
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D. The Board's Conclusions and Interpretations Should Be Given
Deference
The third proposition advanced by the majority was the continued
recognition by the Court that the Board's conclusions, interpreta-
tions, and constructions of the NLRA must be given deference.159 If
the Board espoused a reasonable construction of the Act, the Court
should not reject it simply because another interpretation might be
preferred.160 The majority felt bound to affirm the Board's decision
because it has invariably yielded to the Board's decision that fines im-
posed on employees after they have tendered their resignations con-
stitute an unfair labor practice. 161
In light of these three propositions and the unconvincing argu-
ments advocated by the League, the majority affirmed the decision of
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.162
V. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE WHITE
Justice White concurred with Justice Powell's opinion even though
he saw greater ambiguity in the interpretation of the proviso. Justice
White noted that the proviso could be interpreted to allow restric-
tions on resignations within the meaning of the phrase "retention of
membership." 163 Unable to resolve the conflict between the two in-
terpretations, he yielded to the Board's interpretation.
In justifying deference to the Board, Justice White, relying on
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America,164 restated the position
that the Board is entitled to deference because Congress has given it
the primary responsibility for construing the general provisions of
the Act.165 "Where the statutory language is rationally susceptible to
contrary readings, and the search for congressional intent is unen-
lightening, deference to the Board is not only appropriate but neces-
sary." 166 He concluded the Board's interpretation should be given
159. Id. at 3076-77; Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979) (quoting
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963), quoting NLRB v. United Steel-
workers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958)) (the NLRB has the paramount duty to
apply "the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life .. ").
160. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3075 (quoting Ford Motor Co. 441 U.S. at 497).
161. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3075-76.
162. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1983).
163. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3076 (White, J., concurring).
164. 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (1958).




A. Opinion of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall
1. The Narrow Interpretation of the Majority is Unwarranted
Justice BlackmunL68 believed that the interpretation of the major-
ity was too narrow and without valid support in light of the language
of section 8(b)(1)(A) and its legislative history. First, with regard to
the proviso itself, Justice Blackmun noted that unions need internal
regulations and the freedom to enforce those regulations in order to
remain viable organizations.169 The Board's interpretation of section
7 would necessarily limit the nature of the proviso, giving the NLRB
the ability to enter into and regulate the internal affairs of unions.170
Such a situation, Blackmun argued, was never intended.171 In the
past, the Court recognized the distinction between internal and ex-
ternal affairs. Internal affairs involved voluntary obligations in-
curred by the members. External affairs involved coercive activities
of the union, which were intended, through the indirect use of the
employer's power, to compel the employee to take on duties or join
undesired activities.172 Section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to limit
the internal affairs of the union; it was intended only to eliminate the
coercive and restraining acts of unions while organizing employees.173
Since League Law 13 is outside the intent of section 8(b), it is pro-
tected by the proviso.174 The existence of the rule requires the as-
sent of prospective members prior to joining and therefore literally
involves the acquisition and retention of membership under section
8(b). 175 Since the rule does not coerce the employee, it is outside of
the scope and purpose of section 8(b).176
Second, Justice Blackmun contended that the majority's interpre-
tation was too narrow in light of legislative history. The House ver-
sion of the Act divided section 7 into two subsections: subsection (a)
"gave employees the right to refrain from concerted activit[ies]," and
167. Id. at 3077.
168. Justice Blackmun authored the dissent, and was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall.
169. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 3078.
171. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 71 (1973)).
172. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3078.
173. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 195).
174. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3078.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See supra note 121 for the full text of section 8(b)(1).
176. See 93 CONG. REC. 4431-33 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball). Senator Ball argued
that clearly all that was covered by section 8 is the "coercive and restraining acts of the
union in its efforts to organize unorganized employees." Id. at 4433.
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subsection (b) gave union members rights regarding the affairs of the
union 17 7 To enforce these rights, Congress added section 8(b) and
8(c) to the enacted version. The Senate rejected sections 7(b) and
8(c), not because it considered these two subsections to encompass
the right to refrain language of section 7(a), but because it believed
more study was warranted. 7 8 The right to resign protection incorpo-
rated in the House version of section 8(c) was rejected because the
Senate was unwilling to "impose conditions on the contractual, [in-
ternal] relationship between the union and its members" when it did
not affect employment status.179 This legislative history, Justice
Blackmun argued, clearly indicates that the proviso of section
8(b)(1)(A) must be interpreted in a broad manner, and must there-
fore include the right to restrict resignations.
Third, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority interpreted the
significance of voluntary unionism from an unjustifiably narrow
perpective.180 The majority failed to distinguish between internal af-
fairs, which relate to relationships within the union organization, and
external affairs, which relate to coercive activities of the union.18 1
The proviso was intended to' limit the Board's ability to regulate
those internal affairs, including binding one employee to another
through mutual promises as a prerequisite to union admission. The
dissent stated that the Court viewed voluntary unionism only within
the scope of freedom from enforceable commitments. This resulted
in a paternalistic attitude designed to protect the employee from the
consequences of promises previously made.' 8 2 Justice Blackmun im-
plied that such an approach ignores the intent of the legislation.
2. The Restriction is Reasonable
Justice Blackmun believed that the common law of associations is
applicable in the instant case. Associations, including unions, there-
fore have a common law right to restrict the ability of their members
177. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3079. Justice Blackmun is referring to H.R. 3020,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
178. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3079 (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 6443 (1947) (State-
ments of Sen. Taft)).
179. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3080.
180. Id. at 3081.
181. Id. Justice Blackmun, referring to Scofield, 394 U.S. at 429, noted that the pro-
visions added to section 8(a)(3) were designed to prevent unions from inducing em-
ployers to use their inherent power to enforce union rules. Such union activity was
categorized as "external." Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3081.
182. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3082.
to resign when to do so would defeat the purpose of the association's
existence.18 3 League Law 13 would comport to such a concept be-
cause the League was formed for the purpose of ensuring solidarity
during collective bargaining. Congress never intended the Act to in-
terfere with, impede, or diminish that purpose.18 4
Once an employee promises not to resign during a strike, and has
been given the opportunity to participate in a strike vote, faithfulness
to his promise is expected.18 5 To allow a disenchanted member to ig-
nore his promise and return to work is to allow him to enjoy the ben-
efits of membership without requiring him to live with the risks that
those who enjoy the benefits must share. In light of the potential
snowballing effect, such a rule restricting resignations is reason-
able.1s 6 Enforcement of a promise is not a limitation of the employ-
ees' section 7 rights; it is merely a "vindication of that right to act
collectively and engage in collective bargaining, so long as the prom-
ise is voluntarily made."18 7 As a result, League Law 13 is a condition
of union membership that can be reasonably imposed, and is there-
fore an internal rule protected by the proviso.
3. Deference to the Board is Unjustified
Justice Blackmun argued that the deference the Court affords the
Board is misplaced. Reliance by the majority on the Board's inter-
pretation of the Act is unjustified because it conflicts with congres-
sional purpose.188 The Court is not to "stand aside and rubber-stamp
• ..administrative decisions that [are] inconsistent with a statutory
mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a stat-
ute."' 8 9 It may be dangerous to continually defer to an administra-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 3082. Justice Blackmun referred to 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1947), which states:
"Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." Id.
185. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3083.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 3083-84.
189. Id. at 3084 (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92 (1965)). The Court
has repeatedly deferred to the Board's decision as the agency created by Congress to
administer the Act. However, the Board's decisions are not immune from judicial re-
view. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971).
As Justice Blackmun notes, Congress has given the Court authority to review the
decisions and interpretations of any agency, implying that the decisions of the NLRB
are not sanctioned by Congress as the final word in labor matters.
To the extent necessary for a decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall . . .(2) hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be -
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tive agency. The Court may end up sanctioning unauthorized
interpretations by the agency, resulting in a destructive judicial iner-
tia which may, in turn, lead to an interpretation of congressional pol-
icy inconsistent with congressional intent. 90 Therefore, the Court
should be cautious, and avoid giving deference to the Board in this
case.
4. Enforcement of Conscious Commitments is Proper
Justice Blackmun pointed out that where a union member con-
sciously and knowingly makes a promise to his fellow members, he
should be bound to respect it, consistent with the nature of voluntary
unionism.191 An employee, after promising not to resign, has other
avenues available to rectify his disenchantment with union policies
other than breaching his promise by submitting his resignation dur-
ing a strike.192
Justice Blackmun suggested that the Board and the Court have
done a disservice to the Wagner Act and the employee by overly pro-
tecting the employee's apparent right to resign.193 In so doing, they
give the employee freedom to breach his commitment at the expense
of fellow employees who have relied on it to their detriment, thereby
diminishing the strength of the collective body. Justice Blackmun
concluded that such an action is at odds not only with the structure
and purpose of labor law, but with the very autonomy of the Ameri-
can worker.194
B. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens concurred with Justice Blackmun's dissenting opin-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing pro-
vided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
190. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3084.




ion, especially regarding the conclusions drawn from the legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act.195 He also noted that in light of the
language of the proviso, the "right to refrain" language of section 7
does not encompass the right to resign.196
VII. IMPACT
The potential impact of the Court's decision, while considerably
broad on the surface, remains somewhat questionable in light of the
plurality voting and the absence of a clear majority supporting a par-
ticular position. The decision leaves unresolved a number of issues
which the Board addressed, ranging from the validity of a thirty day
rule to the conditions under which restrictions on resignations would
be acceptable. Notwithstanding the Court's continuing tendency to
avoid addressing these correlative issues, the opinion will undoubt-
edly affect the overall scope of labor relations.
A. Impact on the Union
Since the sole weapon in the union's arsenal is the strike, the
Court's reaffirmation and reemphasis of the employees' section 7
rights will undoubtedly reduce the union's effectiveness. If a
snowballing effect occurs once members begin to resign, as Justice
Blackmun fears, unions will find themselves in a pre-Wagner Act sit-
uation, rendered virtually powerless. Unions could be faced with dif-
ficult decisions, not as to whether a strike is appropriate, but whether
a strike is feasible. While it is doubtful that unions will experience
massive resignations at the outset of an economic strike, it is conceiv-
able that such could occur should the strike last for an extended pe-
riod of time, especially with smaller locals.
The freedom given to employees to resign during a strike may also
have a secondary impact. When prolonged strikes occur, the level of
frustration felt by striking union members usually increases; frustra-
tion that is caused by a slow bargaining process, loss of wages, and
watching other employees return to work. Such frustration may, in
turn, result in coercive and violent behavior directed at former mem-
bers who voted for the strike, but later tendered their resignations.
The general president of the Pattern Makers' League, Charles
Romelfanger, stated at a union meeting that "[t]here has [sic] been
instances where people crossing picket lines have ended up with bro-
ken arms and broken legs .... 197 Walter Burk, financial secretary
and business manager of the Rockford Association, similarly stated:
195. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text for the dissents' discussion of
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act.
196. Pattern Makers, 105 S. Ct. at 3085.
197. Pattern Makers' League of N. Am., 265 N.L.R.B. 1332, 1338 (1982).
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"Well, it has been known that some car and house windows have
been broken."198 Whether these statements were intended as threats
or as statements of fact is unclear. One thing is certain, however, as
the frustration level is elevated by an increase in employees re-
turning to work during a strike: there is a greater likelihood for in-
creased acts of violence.
Second, the threat and fear of mass resignations may force union
bargaining representatives to reshape their traditional bargaining
strategy. As a result of the Court's decision, the balance will shift in
favor of companies which can withstand prolonged strikes. The
longer the strike, the greater the likelihood the company will prevail
if employees are able to resign their union membership and return to
work. Consequently, unions could conceivably be forced to develop a
brief and totally debilitating strike strategy in order to force the com-
pany to bargain in good faith. Should the company be able to with-
stand such a strike, the advantage could quickly shift in its favor.
Third, increased resignation rights could force union leaders to be-
come more responsive to their members. If they recognized the con-
stant threat of resignation, union leaders would have to move away
from the traditional style of management to a more democratic for-
mat. The threat of mass resignation during a strike could undermine
the union's strength and indirectly shape union policy, perhaps in an
even more dramatic manner. In order to defuse that situation, union
officials must readjust their management styles and become more at-
tentive to the wishes of the individual members as well as the
majority.
B. Impact on the Employees
Individual employees are most greatly affected by the Court's deci-
sion. First, they are given an unrestricted right to resign before or
during a strike. They are no longer bound by union rules or the
hardships which accompany prolonged economic strikes. They are
given the freedom to choose between retaining their union member-
ship and enjoying the benefits of worker solidarity or resigning when
the circumstances demand it.
Second, the solidarity of the union is threatened by the unlimited
right to resign. Such a right could lead to the loss of employee bar-
gaining power and parity with the employer. Each employee who re-
198. Id.
signs is left virtually powerless, while those who retain their union
membership face a dwindling leverage previously enjoyed through
worker solidarity. What the employee gains in terms of his relation-
ship with the union is lost in terms of his relationship to the
employer.
C. Impact in General
Two signals are clearly sent to those involved in the area of labor
relations. First, the Supreme Court will continue to defer to the deci-
sions of the NLRB. This suggests that the employee, employer, and
union should take a second look when appealing a NLRB decision to
the court of appeals and to the Supreme Court. It is highly unlikely,
notwithstanding significant evidence to the contrary, that the circuit
court or the Supreme Court will reverse or refuse to enforce an or-
der of the NLRB.
Second, the Supreme Court sends out the message that it is moving
further away from a pro-union posture. Even though the Court's de-
cision failed to reflect a decisive stance, its division on the issues may
be a warning to unions that, barring blatant unfair labor practices by
an employer, the Court is moving away from enforcing the rights of
the union in labor-management relations.
As previously noted, the issue of the right to resign has been highly
contested over the past fifteen years, perhaps more so in theory than
in reality. The impact of the Court's decision may be felt the greatest
in the area of labor law theory rather than in the union halls them-
selves. Since restrictions on the right to resign are a relatively recent
phenomenon instituted to counteract a trend which union officials
have feared, their elimination, where unreasonable, may prove to be
less than devastating.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The National Labor Relations Act was designed to protect the em-
ployee from unfair labor practices committed by both the employer
and the union. The Court reaffirms this protection by emphasizing
the right to refrain, inherent within section 7, over the right to re-
strain, found within section 8, and confirms its resolve to support the
rights of the employee regardless of the situation.
The Court's analysis of the nature of unions, the legislative history
of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso, and the deference it gave to the
NLRB reinforced the intent of the National Labor Relations Act, but
ignored crucial public policy matters. The Court avoided a needed
balancing approach, leaving unions, employers, and the NLRB with-
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out a clear basis for determining when, or if, resignations can be rea-
sonably restricted.
While the Court provided some direction towards a resolution of
the controversy, the path remains uncertain for other closely-related
issues.
LAWRENCE M. BUREK

